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In Western democracies political representation at the national level is still dominated by (old 
and new) political parties. This paper shows that, instead, the representative role of parties 
may have declined at the local level. In Italy, for instance, the average share of municipal 
seats held by non-partisan councillors has almost tripled in the last twenty years. By using an 
original dataset, this paper classifies different types of Italian local lists, assesses their 
relationship with traditional parties and explains territorial variation in their success. The 
results suggest that local lists have become substantially stronger in small municipalities, in 
regions characterised by weak or declining political subcultures and where regionalist parties 
are absent or irrelevant. Finally, contrary to the expectation that declining partisanship is 
linked to modernization processes and direct civic engagement, local lists have achieved their 
best results in the less developed areas of the country.  
Keywords: Local List, Local Election, Italy, Representation, Partisanship, Politicisation. 
 
Introduction and research question  
Vertical connections between different territorial levels of representation seem to have 
weakened in advanced democracies and this has posed a serious challenge to political parties. 
Indeed, the importance of partisanship has substantially declined in some local contexts and 
the emergence and strengthening of ‘local lists’, which do not rely on ‘classic’ party 
organisation and just focus on municipal issues, seem to be a good indicator of this 
phenomenon. Starting from this premise, this paper aims to explain what conditions favour 
the emergence of ‘non-partisan’ representative democracy at the local level. 
The study of developments in local politics is fundamental if we want to understand 
how political representation and participation are evolving and what role political parties may 
still play in contemporary democracies. Moreover, a multi-level approach to the study of 
changing representation is rarely adopted by the literature and, even when it is, it mainly 
focuses on the regional rather than local level. Thus this paper aims to add a new dimension 
to the study of party politics, a dimension that is often neglected but, in fact, is very 
important, since most European citizens are more directly involved in (and affected by) local 
rather than regional or national politics. As underlined by Mabileau et al. (1989, 1), despite 
dramatic changes in global politics and economy, ‘the locality remains the arena in which 
most lives are conducted’ and, therefore, local political participation is ‘of central importance 
to the life of democracy’ (2).  
Italy can be regarded as an emblematic case of declining partisanship in the local 
arena, since, as I show in the next sections, political parties seem increasingly unable (or 
unwilling) to control representation in municipalities. However, such phenomenon has not 
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occurred homogeneously across the Italian territory. The aim of this study is to provide a 
preliminary test of various hypotheses that may explain the strengthening of non-partisan 
representation at the local level. Additionally, I underline that non-partisan representation 
may assume different characteristics depending on the way it relates to more traditional forms 
of party-based representation.  
In the next section I provide a brief literature review on the processes of 
organisational and electoral nationalisation and de-nationalisation of politics. This section is 
followed by a description of the main institutional characteristics of Italian municipalities, 
focusing in particular on their voting system. I then move to the conceptualisation of the 
‘local lists phenomenon’ and I present some hypotheses that may explain variation in the 
strength of non partisan representation in Italian municipalities. The hypotheses are tested by 
using a quantitative analysis that aims to explain variation in non-partisan representation in 
more than 600 municipalities and compares results in the late 1990s to those in the early 
2010s. After discussing the results of the 2015 municipal elections (not included in the 
original dataset), which suggest that the phenomenon of local lists is still growing, I conclude 
that partisan democracy has mainly declined in small municipalities, in the less developed 
areas of the country and where well-established political traditions (also called ‘political sub-
cultures’) are absent or have disappeared. 
 
The role of political parties in local and national representative democracy  
Political parties emerged and strengthened in a context of nationalisation and closure of 
territorial boundaries in Western democracies (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Caramani 2004). To 
put it in Bartolini’s (2005, 250-251) words: 
 
‘Parties provided political personnel that made for “electoral mobilizers”, 
“interest articulators”, and “peripheral political elite” to overlap. They did so by 
providing a single hierarchical order to organize from within various spheres of 
representation activity and to iron out the tensions that emerged from their 
relationships. (…) Political parties thus represented ideological-organizational 
alliances between economic and/or cultural agencies in the centre and local 
leaders and movements in the different peripheries’.  
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During the ‘Golden Age’ of mass politics, the organisational consolidation of political parties 
resulted in a process of centralisation and strengthening of the links between local, regional 
and central elites. Social-democratic or communist parties with their hierarchical and highly 
integrated organisations were seen as models of political forces that could effectively 
mobilise millions of activists and voters (Duverger 1972). Therefore, political parties were 
‘viewed as promoters of national politics down to the local level’ (Aars and Ringkjøb 2005, 
162). One important implication of this process of territorial ‘standardisation’ was an 
increasing politicisation of representation and citizens’ mobilisation at the local level. Indeed, 
it can be argued that, before the politicisation and nationalisation processes occurred, ‘voters 
were mainly mobilised on a local basis – on local issues, whereas after the parties had gained 
ground in local government, voters were more frequently mobilised on the basis of national 
issues’ (ibid.). In his seminal work on party nationalisation, Caramani (2004, 300) shows that 
electoral support for political parties became more territorially homogeneous in many 
European countries during the so called ‘golden age’ of mass politics. At the same time, in 
his conclusions he suggests that over the last decades, ‘territories might once again play a 
major role in European developments and shall therefore deserve a careful look in the future’.  
Scholars have argued that, since the late 1960s, partisan control of local politics has 
weakened. This is partly due to the fact that national party elites have moved towards the 
state and parties have developed new stratarchical organisational structures (Carty 2004; 
Katz and Mair 2009). According to Katz and Mair (2009, 761), ‘stratarchical adaptive 
strategies’ may ‘be pursued by national party leaders seeking to maintain local organizations, 
both for their utility in campaigns and to avoid the public perception of decay, but at the same 
time to free themselves of constraints imposed by those local organizations’. In general 
stratarchy seems to go hand in hand with cartelisation of political parties. Yet the 
stratarchical evolution within political parties did not lead to a full de-politicisation of local 
representation. Indeed, local political elites evolved as ‘parties in franchise’, which, despite 
developing an autonomous political strategy and becoming increasingly disconnected from 
the central leadership, still relied on the ‘party brand’ in electoral competition (Carty 2004). 
This paper suggests that there might be a further step in the evolution of local political 
representation. Political parties may lose most of their appeal in the local arena and citizens 
may even regard local-based politics as an alternative to traditional party politics. The 
emergence of citizens’ or local lists can be seen as an indicator of these new types of 
participation and representation that fully transcend the mediation of party structures. 
According to Reiser and Holtmann (2008, 7), editors of one of the few studies on local lists in 
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Western and Eastern Europe, local lists ‘understand themselves as protector of a harmonious 
factual political style’ and ‘perceive themselves as non-parties’. Moreover, using Holtmann’s 
(2008, 11) definition, local lists are focused on local jurisdictions and are solely locally 
organised. This means that they are just interested in local issues and only have a town-based 
organisation, which is not formally linked to any provincial, regional or national political 
organisation. 
Some studies on party (de-)nationalisation have not provided strong evidence of the 
declining role of parties in the local dimension. For instance, the study by Aars and Ringkjøb 
(2005) shows that at the beginning of the 20th century political parties still dominated local 
representation in Norway, although things might have changed in more recent years. The 
paper on Austrian municipal representation by Ennser-Jedenastik et al. (2013) mainly focuses 
on differences in the nationalisation of local politics across the Länder but also suggests that 
there might be an over-time, general decrease in partisanship deriving from the weakening of 
traditional party organisations. The case of Italy, presented here, may be regarded as a much 
clearer example of declining strength of political parties in the local arena. At the same time, 
the great variation in the strength of non-partisan local lists across Italian municipalities 
makes it possible to test various hypotheses on the conditions that have led to less politicised 
local representation.  
 
The voting system in Italian municipalities 
 
Before moving to the analysis of local lists’ success in Italy, a brief introduction to the voting 
system adopted in Italian municipalities is presented in this section. Since the electoral reform 
of 1993, mayors in the Italian municipalities have been directly elected (Baldini 2002) and 
the composition of municipal councils has been determined through a mixed proportional-
majoritarian system. Indeed, the list(s) supporting the winning mayoral candidate obtain a 
‘majority bonus’ (roughly around 60% of the seats), while the remaining seats are allocated 
proportionally among the losing lists. Yet, whereas in municipalities with less than 15,000 
inhabitants the majority bonus is allocated regardless of the share of votes obtained by the 
winning candidate, in the other municipalities a two-round election is in place: if no 
candidate obtains more than 50% of the vote, a second election round involving the two 
strongest candidates takes place after two weeks.  Additionally, in municipalities with more 
than 15,000 inhabitants, all parties and local movements may form autonomous lists in the 
first round and then form alliances in the second round. In smaller municipalities, instead, 
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parties supporting the same mayoral candidate must from a single list. This latter point makes 
it more difficult to assess changes in the composition of representation in small municipalities 
(Pritoni 2014, 385). For this reason, this study focuses on municipalities with more than 
15,000 inhabitants.  
 
 
Non-partisan representation in Italian municipalities: between citizens’ autonomy and 
‘partisanship in disguise’  
 
The existence of local lists in Italy is not a recent phenomenon. In particular, as mentioned 
above, the 1993 electoral reform strengthened the role of mayoral candidates and this in turn 
produced a weakening of the role of political parties in local politics. Direct mayoral election 
made the creation of ‘personal lists’ or ‘civic lists’ a more appealing option in a competition 
in which classic party labels became less relevant (Magnier, 2004).  However, until the late 
1990s, non-partisan lists still played a rather limited role in sub-national politics. Parties still 
seemed to control all levels of government and remained the main structures of connection 
between centre and periphery. Even in a context of stratarchisation of party organisations, at 
the end of the 20th century Italian political parties were still regarded as the main channels of 
representation of local interests. Becoming a local councillor could be the beginning of a long 
political career through the different layers of government. In sum, local lists were mainly 
exceptions in a context in which politics and administration at all levels were still dominated 
by political parties.  
At the beginning of the 21st century the situation seems to have radically changed, as 
is show in the following sections. However, before assessing changes in the composition of 
local representation, the term ‘local list’ needs to be specified. Indeed, only some local lists 
are fully independent from party politics. This is because, as mentioned above, the voting 
system adopted in Italy for municipalities that have more than 15,000 inhabitants, allows for 
the formation of coalitions of different lists in a two-round electoral competition. In this 
context, one should distinguish between local lists that cannot be directly or indirectly 
associated with mainstream party competition and those that are more inclined to establish 
alliances with traditional party lists. I call the former independent lists, whereas the latter can 
be defined as politicised local lists or partisan lists ‘in disguise’. Indeed, in a context of 
increasing de-politicisation of the local dimension, political parties may find it convenient to 
‘outsource’ representation to lists that are not formally recognisable as ‘partisan’ but, in fact, 
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contribute to the victory of coalitions in which political parties still play a significant role. 
Pritoni (2014, 390) defines this as ‘blame avoidance’ strategy, aimed at attracting the votes of 
those citizens, who are increasingly sceptical of purely party-based politics. Also Magnier 
(2004: 172) has argued that in some cases local lists may conceal old and new party 
affiliations.  
 
Operationalisation of local lists’ representation and description of dependent variable 
 
Studies focusing on local representation have relied on different indicators measuring the 
strength of local lists. In their paper on Norwegian local representation Aars and Ringkjøb 
(2005) mainly refer to the number of and electoral support (in % of votes) for local lists, 
whereas in their analysis of the Austrian case  Ennser-Jedenastik et al (2013) also use an 
index of party nationalisation. This paper focuses on the changing characteristics of local 
representation in Italy and the strength of local lists is therefore measured in terms of share of 
seats won in the main representative institution existing at the local level: the municipal 
council. If, for instance, local lists control two seats out of twenty in a municipal council, 
their strength in terms of representation is 10%.  
Table 1 provides a summary of local lists’ representation (as a percentage of 
municipal council seats) in 628 Italian municipalities having more than 15,000 inhabitants. 
Most of the data used for this study are taken from the archive of the Italian Interior Ministry 
(http://elezionistorico.interno.it/), which contains electoral data of local, regional, national 
and European elections. Data from some municipalities in ‘special status’ regions (Sicily, 
Sardinia, Friuli Venetia Giulia, Aosta Valley and Trentino-Alto Adige) are not in the Interior 
Ministry Archive and their results have been taken from the online archives of the two main 
Italian newspapers (Corriere della Sera and Repubblica). It can be seen that the average 
representation of local lists in the main Italian municipalities has increased from 13% in the 
late 1990s to 34.1% in the early 2010s.  If we consider different types of local lists, it can be 
noted that the average share of seats controlled by independent lists has increased fourfold, 
from 2.1% to almost 10%. At the same, representation of politicised local lists has more than 
doubled, from 10.9 to 24.2%. It is also interesting to see that, as suggested by the standard 
deviation, today cross-municipal variation in representation of independent local lists is 
greater than that of politicised local lists. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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How can such variation be explained? In which Italian municipalities have local lists been 
more successful in the last 15-20 years? Next section presents a set of hypotheses that 
consider the effects of town size, differences in the levels of socio-economic development 
and social capital between Central-Northern and Southern Italy, the existence of ‘political 
subcultures’ and regionalist mobilisation on the strength of local lists representation.  
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Electoral participation and representation can be expected to become more focused on local 
issues and dominated by non-partisan actors as the size of municipalities decreases. Studies 
have proved that the ‘nationalisation’ of party systems is clearly affected by how large sub-
national political entities are (Dahl and Tufte 1973; Ennser-Jedenastik et al 2013). Indeed, 
party organisations are more likely to reach larger towns and recruit members and activists in 
broader communities. Additionally, it is strategically more important for political parties to 
obtain representation in regional or provincial capitals rather than in small towns and villages. 
Indeed, control of large municipalities may also be an asset in terms of prestige, resources, 
political personnel and, ultimately, votes in national electoral competitions. Therefore 
H1. Local lists’ representation decreases as the size of municipalities increases 
Another interesting hypothesis that can be tested is whether the phenomenon of local lists is 
linked to ‘social capital’ or ‘civicness’. Putnam’s (1993) study has shown that Central-
Northern Italian regions are characterised by a more dynamic and integrated civil society than 
Southern regions. The existence of strong social capital is also accompanied by higher levels 
of economic development. Thus one may use the concept of ‘socio-economic development’ 
to highlight both social and economic maturity of a political system.  So far the link between 
socio-economic development and the emergence of ‘partyless’ democracy has not been 
sufficiently investigated. If the crisis of partisanship is linked to processes of modernisation 
and to the emergence of a more complex society, which is less controllable by political elites 
due to increasing citizens’ awareness (Vampa 2015), one may expect that the phenomenon of 
local and citizens’ lists has been more significant in Central-Northern Italy than in Southern 
Italy. Moreover, local lists are often called ‘civic movements’ or ‘civic parties’ in the 
literature (Boogers 2008; Reiser and Holtmann 2008) and, therefore, their strength may be 
expected to be positively associated with levels of social capital, which ‘result in citizens 
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getting more involved in civic engagement and becoming active citizens within their 
communities’ (Kapuku, 2011: 25). It follows that 
H2. In regions characterised by higher levels of socio-economic development and ‘civicness’ 
(Central-Northern Italy), the representation of local lists will be stronger. 
 
An additional factor that may affect variation in local lists’ representation is the existence of 
well-established political traditions that are geographically concentrated and derive from 
long-term dominance of one party or coalition of parties. These traditions are often defined as 
‘political subcultures’ to underline their peculiarity and differences from the more fluid and 
plural political context existing at the national level. According to Trigilia (1986, 162), 
regions with strong political subcultures are characterised by ‘the predominance of a 
particular political tradition, whose origins usually go back to the beginning of the century, 
and a complex of institutions (parties, interest groups, cultural and welfare structures) which 
derive from the same politico-ideological matrix’. Generally, it may be expected that in 
regions characterised by strong political subcultures, political parties that are linked to such 
subcultures are more resilient in the electoral competition at the local level (Vampa, 2015, 
238). This may in turn have a limiting effect on the emergence and strengthening of local 
lists. On the other hand, the absence of well-rooted political traditions may make electoral 
competition more fluid and open to the challenges coming from non-partisan actors. 
Therefore, 
 
H3. Municipal representation of local lists is less strong in regions characterised by the 
existence of strong political subcultures. 
For many decades, two political sub-cultures have played an important role in different 
Italian regions. The first one is the so-called red subculture (Floridia, 2010), dominated by 
left-wing parties, which were particularly strong in central Italian regions such as Tuscany, 
Emilia Romagna and Umbria. The three regions are also called the ‘red belt’ (Vampa 2009). 
The second one is the white subculture (Baccetti and Messina 2009) that emerged from the 
political hegemony of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and other catholic organisations 
in the North East of Italy, particularly in Veneto and Friuli Venetia Giulia. Such hegemony, 
however, was abruptly interrupted in the 1990s, when the established party system collapsed 
as a result of changes in the international political system, such as the end of Communism in 
Eastern Europe and processes Europeanisation (Golden 2004), and corruption scandals (the 
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so-called Tangentopoli). On the other hand, in the red regions we can find organisational and 
electoral continuity in the dominance of centre-left parties, which, despite undergoing a 
process of ideological and organisational reform, managed to adapt to the new political 
situation and survived. 
Generally, in the white regions changes in the political landscape have been so 
dramatic that they may have seriously undermined well-established political traditions. 
Indeed, although subcultures are well-rooted in society and are long-term phenomena that do 
not immediately disappear as a consequence of (mainly) exogenous shocks, they tend to 
significantly weaken or transform when the political offer radically changes. Thus a sub-
hypothesis should be formulated: 
 
H3bis. The representation of local lists will be less strong in regions characterised by a red 
(i.e. centre-left) political sub-culture than in those where the Christian democratic tradition 
used to be hegemonic (white regions).  
The last hypothesis presented in this article focuses on the connection between regionalist 
mobilisation and the emergence of more ‘local-focused’ politics at the sub-national level. The 
literature on multi-level party politics has paid increasing attention to the strengthening of 
regionalist political parties (De Winter and Türstan 1998). Such parties, which can also be 
defined as politically organised territorial movements, are often seen as expression of ‘sub-
state nationalism’ highlighting the ethnic or civic (but also socio-economic) diversity of a 
‘peripheral’ region (Keating 2001) and challenging the main state-wide parties (Hino 2012, 
60). This type of political mobilisation is linked to the ‘centre– periphery’ cleavage (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967) and adds a territorial dimension to traditional party competition. The 
largest regionalist party emerged in Italy, the Northern League, supported and argued for 
‘federalism’ and local democracy as opposed to national politics and the centralised State 
(Diamanti 2014, 7).  
It should be underlined that regionalist parties significantly differ from strictly local 
lists. Indeed the former still rely on more or less structured party organisations, which 
coordinate the strategies of local branches, and often compete in state-wide elections. On the 
contrary, local lists are not organised along traditional lines, since they are often horizontal 
networks of citizens focusing on municipal issues and are not affiliated to a cross-local 
organisation controlled and coordinated by a central leadership.  Yet one may hypothesise 
that in those areas of Italy where regionalist parties have become stronger, a more localist 
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culture focused on territorial issues may have developed. Therefore, regionalist parties may 
have had a contagion effect on the political landscape of municipalities and may have 
favoured the emergence of locally-focused lists. The opposite can also be true, since one may 
argue that the existence of regionalist parties, which already represent and incorporate local 
interests, has hindered the emergence and strengthening of purely local lists (replacement 
effect). Therefore, two alternative hypotheses can be formulated 
H4a. Local lists are stronger in those municipalities in which regionalist parties are 
stronger, due to a contagion effect of territorial mobilisation on the local political landscape. 
H4b. Local lists’ representation is weaker in those municipalities in which regionalist parties 
are stronger, since the latter already incorporate and represent local interests (replacement 
effect).  
 
Testing the hypotheses 
Table 2 provides a preliminary analysis of the conditions that have favoured the 
strengthening of local lists. Local lists, particularly independent ones, seem to have 
significantly strengthened in small towns. It is also quite interesting to see that, particularly in 
recent years, municipal representation of both politicised and independent local lists has been 
more pronounced in Southern than in Central-Northern regions. A divergence between white 
and red regions can also be noted. Indeed, whereas in the former politicised local lists have 
been particularly successful, in the latter they have failed to become a relevant actor in 
municipal representation. Lastly, it seems that, particularly in the 2010–2014 period, the 
representation of both independent and politicised lists is much smaller in municipalities 
where regionalist parties are strong.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
A multivariate, linear regression model can be used to systematically test the hypotheses 
presented in the previous section.  The dependent variable is the share of municipal seats won 
by local lists. The population size independent variable is measured in thousands of 
inhabitants. A dichotomous independent variable has been created to compare Central-
Northern to Southern regions. Two dummy variables also compare red and white regions to 
other regions without specific political subculture. Finally, the strength of territorial and 
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regionalist parties is measured in terms of percentage of seats controlled by these parties in 
the municipal council.  
The following analysis first applies the model to municipal representation of all types 
of local lists and then considers independent and politicised local lists separately. In all cases, 
results of the 1995–1999 period are compared to those of the 2010–2014 period, to see 
whether the determinants of local lists’ representation have changed in the last 20 years.  
In table 3 it can be noted that, in the late 1990s, total representation of local lists was 
significantly lower in regions characterised by a red political subculture and in those areas 
where regionalist parties were stronger. Such results are confirmed and are even more 
noticeable in the 2009-2014 period, even if we control for the share of representation of local 
lists in the 1995-1999 period (model II). Additionally it should be noted that today the share 
of seats won by local lists is negatively correlated with the population size of municipalities. 
Interestingly, local lists are stronger in regions characterised by a white political subculture in 
both periods (in fact, the magnitude of the coefficient increases considerably if we move from 
1995-1999 to 2009-2004). This may suggest that the collapse of the Christian Democratic 
Party, which used to be dominant in these regions, paved the way for the creation of lists that 
are not formally linked to any political organisation. Lastly, in the 1995–1999 period there 
was no significant difference in the level of representation of local lists between Central-
Northern and Southern regions. Yet today the share of council seats controlled by local lists 
is, on average, 14 percentage points lower in the municipalities of Central-Northern Italy than 
in those of the Southern regions. This means that, contrary to what hypothesised, locally-
focused, partyless representation has mainly strengthened in regions characterised by low 
levels of socio-economic development and civicness.  
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Similar results emerge if we just consider politicised local lists (table 4). Also in this case, the 
difference between Central-Northern and Southern Italy was negligible in the late 1990s but 
has become significant in recent years, even controlling for all the other independent 
variables. Interestingly, in the white regions representation of politicised local lists seems to 
be much stronger today than in the 1995–1999 period. On the other hand, the negative 
coefficients of red political subculture and population size are confirmed (although the latter 
is less statistically and substantially significant than in the previous model). Similarly, 
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politicised local lists are significantly weaker in those towns where regionalist parties are 
stronger. These results in the period from 2010 to 2014 hold even if we control for the results 
of local lists in the 1995–1999 period (Model II). 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
Lastly, we can consider independent local lists (table 5). It is interesting to notice that in the 
late 1990s, this type of local lists had slightly more representation in Central-Northern Italy 
but, today, in a context of decline of partisan politics at the local level, it has become much 
stronger in Southern Italy. It should also be highlighted that, unlike politicised local lists, 
independent local lists do not seem significantly weaker in the red regions or significantly 
stronger in the white regions. Therefore, in the case, the effect of political subcultures is 
negligible. As in the previous models, regionalist mobilisation seems to have had a 
replacement effect on the representation of independent local lists. Finally, the share of 
council seats controlled by independent lists decreases as the size of the municipality 
increases. This confirms the fact that the administration of larger towns and cities is still 
dominated by political parties and is generally more politicised.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 summarises the main findings of this paper. The size of municipalities seems to have 
mainly affected the strengthening of independent local lists, whereas it has had a negligible 
effect in the case of politicised local lists. The hypothesis that local lists are stronger in more 
socio-economically developed regions of Italy does not seem to be true. In fact, in Central-
Northern regions the representation of all types of local lists has been much lower than in 
Southern regions. The effect of political subcultures has not been homogeneous. In white 
regions, politicised local lists have significantly strengthened. On the other hand, the same 
type of local lists has been considerably weaker in regions characterised by a red political 
subculture. At the same time, no significant correlation has been found between the existence 
of political subcultures and strength of independent local lists. Lastly, regionalist and 
territorial parties seem to have limited, rather than encouraged, the formation and success of 
all types of local lists (replacement effect).  
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[Table 6 about here] 
 
The 2015 election: even stronger local lists 
The trend towards declining partisanship at the local level seems to have even accelerated in 
the last election (May 2015), the results of which were not considered in the original dataset 
used for the main section of this paper. As shown in Table 7, in the 84 municipalities voting 
in 2015 and for which comparable data are available, all local lists won, on average, 46.2% of 
the seats. This is an increase of more than 15 percentage points from the previous election in 
these municipalities. Yet whereas representation of politicised local lists has moderately 
increased in the 84 municipalities (to around 27%), the share of seats obtained by 
independent local lists has skyrocketed from 8.3% to 19.1%. This seems to point to the 
further decline of partisanship in local politics. Even politicised local lists, which have also 
been defined as ‘partisan lists in disguise’, are no longer sufficient means to compensate the 
weakening appeal of traditional parties.  
Looking at the characteristics of the municipalities it is noticeable that the 
phenomenon of local lists has boomed in medium-sized municipalities and in those ones 
where regionalist parties are absent. Interestingly, independent local lists have significantly 
strengthened in the municipalities of the red regions whereas politicised ones have achieved 
important results where the white political subculture used to be dominant.  Finally, the gap 
between North and South has remained very significant. In fact, it has even widened. In the 
Southern municipalities involved in the 2015 election, local lists (politicised plus independent 
ones) have come to control, on average, more than 50% of the council seats. Therefore, for 
the first time since 1945, lists that are not directly identifiable with political parties have 
become the main representative force in the main Southern municipalities participating in a 
local election. In Central-Northern Italy, instead, they have won slightly more than 30% of 
the seats, increasing their average share of representation without challenging the primary 
role of political parties. This confirms the existence of ‘two Italies’, one where parties are still 
important mediators between national and local politics and another where they seem to play 
an increasingly marginal role.   
[Table 7 about here] 
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Summary and conclusions 
In recent years, both independent and politicised local lists seem to have become important 
sources of representation in the less socioeconomically developed areas of Italy (the South), 
in smaller towns and, to a lesser extent, in regions that were once characterised by a 
Christian-Democratic, white political subculture.  
Contrary to what initially hypothesised, municipalities in socio-economically 
developed regions have not experienced an increase in non-partisan political representation as 
significant as that of Southern municipalities. This seems to suggest that political parties have 
maintained a more relevant role in those regions where, according to several studies, not only 
economic development but also social capital and civic involvement are stronger. Therefore, 
civicness and more complex and modern networks of social relations may be a support, rather 
than a challenge, to party-based democracy.  
In Southern Italy, party lists have been mainly replaced by politicised local lists, 
which are created by local party leaders in order to attract a larger share of personal votes and 
meet citizens’ demands for a more locally-based, rather than partisan, electoral competition. 
This seems to point to the weakening of party organisations in this area of the country. 
Although local caciques were already very powerful and enjoyed some political autonomy in 
the last decades of the 20th century, at that time they still relied on the organisational support 
of organised political parties. In fact, in the 1995-1999 period, there was no substantial 
difference in the representation of local lists between Southern and Central-Northern regions. 
Today, however, the fragmentation and weakening of cross-territorial party organisations has 
significantly accelerated in the South and political representation has been ‘outsourced’ to 
local lists. Floridia (2014) has defined this phenomenon as micro-notabilato to underline the 
increasing disconnection between state-wide party organisations and the political actions of 
local notables. Thus, a society characterised by more fragmented and family-based relations 
may be more affected by the decline of partisanship than a highly civic, integrated and 
economically developed society. 
It is also interesting to compare the two areas of Italy in Central-Northern Italy that 
are characterised by strong political ‘subcultures’. The organisational survival of left-wing 
political forces, which are linked to the so-called red political subculture, seems to have 
prevented the strengthening of non-partisan politics in central regions, such as Emilia 
Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria. Even though Profeti (2014) has underlined that in recent 
elections the number of local or citizens’ lists competing in the red regions has increased, 
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they do not seem to attract enough support to undermine the hegemony of centre-left parties 
and, in any case, their success is much less significant than in other areas of the country. On 
the other hand, in those regions characterised by a white political subculture, the collapse of 
the Christian Democratic Party seems to have resulted in the multiplication of local lists 
(particularly politicised ones).  
Yet in some Northern regions the emergence of local lists has also been 
counterbalanced by the strengthening of regionalist parties – in particular the Northern 
League – that have developed a more locally-focused political agenda and have aimed to 
incorporate local interests in their organisation. Indeed, regression results suggest that there 
might be a ‘replacement effect’ of regionalist parties on local lists’ representation, that is, 
wherever regionalist parties are stronger, purely local lists are weaker.  
It should also be added that the phenomenon of local lists seems quite different from 
what has been defined as ‘protest politics’. The Italian case is noticeable not only for the local 
crisis of traditional parties but also for the emergence of new ‘anti-system’ parties. The Five 
Star Movement, founded by the former comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo initially emerged 
at the municipal level (Natale 2014; Turner 2013) but then achieved an unexpected success in 
the 2013 general elections (25 per cent of the total vote). Its campaign with mainly based on 
opposing the established political elite and introducing forms of direct and web democracy  
(Biorcio, 2014; Hartleb, 2013). Yet a recent paper by Vampa (2015) clearly shows that the 
Five Star Movement has achieved better results in those municipalities in which local lists 
have been weaker (in Northern Italy and in the red regions).  
To sum up, this study has underlined the increasing importance of non-partisan 
representation at the local level in Italy and has tried to detect the conditions that favour the 
emergence and strengthening of local lists. The framework used in this paper can be adapted 
and applied to other countries to see whether the phenomenon of non-partisan local 
representation is common to all advanced democracies and is growing at the same rate in 
Europe. More generally, future research should further investigate within-country and cross-
country differences in the characteristics of local representation. Thus, by complementing the 
already rich literature on national and regional politics with new insights on the local 
dimension, the multi-level character of political participation and representation will be fully 
acknowledged.  
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Table 1. Summary of local lists’ representation (as percentage of municipal council seats) in 
628 Italian municipalities (comparing the 1995-1999 period to 2010-2014 period)  
 
 1995-1999 2010-2014 
Type of lists Min. Max. Average Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. Average Standard 
Deviation 
Total local 
lists  
0 85 13 15.6 0 100 34.1 22.3 
Independent 
local lists  
0 65 2.1 7.4 0 100 9.9 19.2 
Politicized 
local lists 
0 85 10.9 14.2 0 90 24.2 17.7 
Source: Italian Interior Ministry (http://www.interno.gov.it/). Author’s own calculation.  
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Table 2. Mapping the strength of local lists representation in Italy (average percentage of 
municipal council seats controlled by local lists)  
 1995-1999 2010-2014 
 Total Politicized Independent Total Politicized Independent 
Population Size 
of Municipality 
      
Small   
(<50,000 ) 
14.3 12.1 2.2 36.2 24.8 11.4 
Medium 
(between 50,000 
and 100,000) 
7.8 6.3 1.5 29.8 24.1 5.7 
Large 
(>100,000) 
9.8 8.8 1 21.3 18.2 3.1 
North-South 
Divide 
      
Central-
Northern 
Regions 
12.3 9.3 3 25.4 18.6 6.8 
Southern 
Regions 
13.7 12.6 1.1 43.1 30 13.1 
Political Sub-
Culture 
      
No subculture 13.6 12 1.6 37.3 26.2 11.1 
Red 8.4 5 3.4 17.5 11.5 6 
White 16.8 13.2 3.6 37.2 30.6 6.6 
Regionalist 
Party 
      
Non existing 13 11 2 38.9 25.9 13 
Weak (<10%) 13.5 10.8 1.7 28.6 22.1 6.5 
Strong (>10%) 12.7 11 1.7 25.3 21.4 3.9 
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Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model predicting share of municipal representation of 
all local lists (percentage of municipal council seats) 
 Coefficients  
(1995–1999)  
Coefficients   
(2009–2014) 
  
  Model I Model II 
H1. Size of Municipality1 -0.006 (0.004) -0.18 (0.05)*** -0.016*** (0.005) 
H2. Central-Northern 
Regions2 
1 (1.7) -14.5 (1.9)*** -14.4 (1.9)*** 
H3. Political Subculture3    
1. Red subculture -6.3 (2.1)*** -12.4 (2.5)*** -10.7 (2.4)*** 
2. White subculture 4.4 (2.5)* 13.3 (3)*** 12.2 (3)*** 
H4. Regionalist Parties4 -0.1 (0.05)** -0.6 (0.09)*** -0.6 (0.09)*** 
Local lists  
(1995-1999) 
--- --- 0.3 (0.05)*** 
Constant  16 (1) *** 46 (1.2) 41.6 (1.3) *** 
N 628 628 628 
Adj. R-squared  0.02 0.25 0.3 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard error in brackets.  
                                                          
1 Thousands of inhabitants. 
2 Here centre-northern regions (Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli Venetia Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, 
Liguria, Tuscany, Emilia Romagna, Umbria, Marche) are compared with Southern regions (Latium, Campania, 
Abruzzi, Molise, Apulia, Molise, Basilicata, Sicily, Sardinia).  
3 Reference category: regions with no specific political subculture. Red regions: Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and 
Umbria. White regions: Veneto and Friuli Venetia Giulia.  
4 Measured as a share of municipality seats controlled by regionalist parties.  
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Table 4. OLS model predicting share of representation of politicized local lists (percentage of 
municipal council seats) 
  
 Coefficients  
(1995–1999)  
Coefficients  I 
(2009–2014) 
  
  Model I Model II 
H1. Size of Municipality -0.004 (0.003) -0.009 (0.004)** -0.008 (0.004)* 
H2. Central-Northern 
Regions 
-1.6 (1.5) -9.9 (1.6)*** -9.8 (1.6)*** 
H3. Political Subculture    
1. Red subculture -6.9 (1.9)*** -9.2 (2.1)*** -8.6 (2.1)*** 
2. White subculture 3.2 (2.3) 12.7 (2.6) *** 12.5 (2.6)*** 
H4. Strength of 
Regionalist Parties 
-0.1 (0.05)** -0.26 (0.08)*** -0.3 (0.08)*** 
Local lists  
(1995-1999) 
--- --- 0.09 (0.05)** 
Constant  12.4(0.9)*** 31.4(1)*** 30.2 (1.3)*** 
N 628 628 628 
Adj. R-squared  0.04 0.18 0.19 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 . Standard error in brackets.  
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Table 5. OLS model predicting share of representation of independent local lists (percentage 
of municipal council seats) 
 Coefficients  
(1995–1999)  
Coefficients  
(2009–2014) 
  
  Model I Model II 
H1. Size of municipality 0.001 (0.002) -0.009 (0.005)* -0.009 (0.005)* 
H2. Central-Northern 
Regions 
1.7 (0.08)** -4.5 (1.8) ** -4.8 (1.8)** 
H3. Political Subculture    
1. Red subculture 0.6(1) -3.2 (2.4) -3.4 (2.4) 
2. White subculture 1.1(1.2) 0.6 (3) 0.04 (3) 
H4. Strength of 
Regionalist Parties 
-0.02 (0.03) -0.3 (0.09)*** -0.3 (0.09)*** 
Local lists  
(1995-1999) 
--- --- 0.2 (0.1)* 
Constant  1.9 (0.3) *** 14.7 (1)*** 14.4 (1)*** 
N 628 628 628 
Adj. R-squared  0.01 0.04 0.05 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 . Standard error in brackets. 
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Table 6. Relationship between independent variables and municipal representation of local 
lists (results of OLS analysis) 
 All local lists Politicized lists Independent lists 
Size of Municipality Negative Negative Negative 
Socio-economic 
development (comparison 
between Central-Northern 
and Southern regions) 
Negative Negative Negative 
Political Subculture Positive – White 
Negative – Red  
Positive – White 
Negative – Red  
Not significant 
Regionalist mobilization Negative Negative Negative 
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Table 7. Share of seats (%) won by local lists in 2015 (84 municipalities). Difference with 
previous election in brackets. 
 Total Politicized Independent 
Size of Municipality    
Small  (<50,000) 48.1 (+14.1) 25.8 (+1.4) 22.2 (+12.5) 
Medium (between 
50,000 and 100,000) 
41.7 (+20) 31.1 (+14.8) 10.6 (+6) 
Large (>100,000) 34.5 (+15.5) 29.7 (+13.7) 4.8 (+1.8) 
North-South divide    
Central-Northern 
Regions 
31.6 (+11.6) 19.8 (+6.4) 11.8  (+5.6) 
Southern Regions 55.6 (+17.8) 31.8 (+3.5) 23.7 (+14) 
Political Sub-
Culture 
   
No subculture 46.8 (+14.8) 27.3 (+4.3) 19.3 (+10.3) 
Red 38.1 (+21.6) 11.9 (-0.1) 26.3 (+21.3) 
White 46.9 (+22.5) 41.4 (+17.7) 5.5 (+4.8) 
Regionalist Party    
Non existing 58.1 (+19.1) 32.5 (+5) 25.4 (+13.9) 
Weak (<10%) 33.7 (+8.4) 28.6 (+5.1) 5.1 (+3.3) 
Strong (>10%) 30.5 (+4.5) 17.7 (+1.3) 12.8 (+3.3) 
Total Average 46.2 (+15.6) 27.1 (+4.8) 19.1 (+10.8) 
 
 
 
 
